


Disaster Accountability Project



Report On Emergency Evacuation Planning for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Center

Biscayne Bay, Florida



2015

Table of Contents

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| <u>About Disaster Accountability Project</u> | 3 |
| <u>Acknowledgements</u> | 3 |
| <u>The U.S. Government Accountability Office's Report Recommending Improved Emergency Preparedness Surrounding Nuclear Power Stations</u> | 4-6 |
| <u>Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station and the Population within 50 Miles</u> | 6-7 |
| <u>Fig. 1 - 10-mile radius from Turkey Point Power Plant - Emergency Planning Zone (shaded area)</u> | 8 |
| <u>Fig. 2 - 50-mile radius from Turkey Point Power Plant (blue-shaded area)</u> | 9 |
| <u>DAP Survey of Jurisdictions within 50 miles of Turkey Point</u> | 10 |
| <u>Table 1. Responses to DAP's Document Requests</u> | 11 |
| <u>Conclusion: Public Education and Shadow Evacuation Planning are Inadequate within the 50-mile radius of the Turkey Point Plant</u> | 14-15 |
| <u>Appendix A</u> | 16-17 |
| <u>Appendix B</u> | 18 |

About Disaster Accountability Project

Disaster Accountability Project (DAP) saves lives and reduces suffering after disasters by maximizing the impact of preparedness, response, and relief through citizen oversight and engagement, policy research and advocacy, and public education.

DAP is the leading nonprofit organization that provides long-term independent oversight of disaster management systems.

DAP engages a dedicated community to advance policy research and advocacy, promote transparency, and encourage the public to participate in oversight, community-based organizing, and discussions about disaster preparedness and relief.

Dedicated citizen oversight is necessary to ensure preparedness, relief, and recovery are effective, communities are sufficiently engaged and more resilient, and best practices and lessons learned are implemented so that mistakes are not repeated.

Prior to the creation of DAP, there was no organization providing independent oversight of the agencies and organizations responsible for these critical life-saving responsibilities.

Additional information concerning DAP's ongoing disaster accountability efforts can be found at the organization's web site: <http://www.disasteraccountability.org/>

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Justina LaSalle, Alexandria Arnold, Bryan Carey, Nicholas Santangelo, Mark Williams, Colin Wright, Meg Gilley, Erika Lancaster, and many other Disaster Accountability Project volunteers and interns for their assistance writing, collecting data, and assisting with this report.

The following report is part of a new initiative by DAP to investigate emergency planning and public awareness in the areas surrounding nuclear power plants operating in the United States.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office's Report Recommending Improved Emergency Preparedness Surrounding Nuclear Power Stations

In March 2013, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report entitled *EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: NRC Needs to Better Understand Likely Public Response to Radiological Incidents at Nuclear Power Plants*, GAO-13-243 (available at <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-243>).¹ GAO prepared its report in response to the nuclear emergency that resulted from the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami that severely damaged the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan, which led to the largest release of radiation since the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster.² As a consequence of radiation release, Japanese authorities evacuated nearly 150,000 people located within 19 miles of the stricken plant.³

At the same time, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recommended that U.S. citizens in Japan evacuate the area if they were located within 50 miles of the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant.⁴ The NRC recommendation states that “[u]nder the guidelines for public safety that would be used in the United States under similar circumstances, the NRC believes it is appropriate for U.S. residents within 50 miles of the Fukushima reactors to evacuate.”⁵ The NRC recommendation also was broadcast to U.S. citizens in Japan via a travel warning on the U.S. Embassy website in Japan.⁶ The NRC recommendation to evacuate a 50-mile zone exceeded the 10-mile emergency planning zone that is the current standard for nuclear plant emergency planning in the United States.

In the U.S., the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for overseeing preparedness by state and local authorities situated near nuclear plants.⁷ NRC regulations have established 10-mile emergency planning zones around domestic nuclear power plants.⁸ Local and state authorities within the 10-mile zone must develop protective action plans for responding to a radiological incident that include evacuations and sheltering in place.⁹ Local and state authorities also must provide information on radiation and protective actions to residents of the 10-mile zone on an annual basis.¹⁰

¹ United States Government Accountability Office. Emergency Preparedness: NRC Needs to Better Understand Likely Public Response to Radiological Incidents at Nuclear Power Plants. Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, March 2013.

² *Id.* at 1.

³ *Id.*

⁴ See NRC Provides Protective Action Recommendations Based on U.S. Guidelines, No. 11-050, March 16, 2011 (available at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2011/11-050.pdf>).

⁵ *Id.* (emphasis added).

⁶ See U.S. Department of State Travel Warning, March 17, 2011, <http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/acs/tacs-travel20110317.html>.

⁷ United States Government Accountability Office. Emergency Preparedness: NRC Needs to Better Understand Likely Public Response to Radiological Incidents at Nuclear Power Plants. Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, March 2013. 2; see also <http://www.fema.gov/radiological-emergency-preparedness-program>.

⁸ See 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2).

⁹ United States Government Accountability Office, *supra* note 1, at 5.

¹⁰ See 10 CFR 50 Appendix E Section IV.D.2.

NRC regulatory action subsequent to the Fukushima Dai-ichi disaster has considered the adequacy of the 10-mile emergency planning zone size and determined that no expansion is necessary.¹¹ The NRC concluded that a 1979 policy statement provides basis for the 10-mile emergency planning zone, including an assumption that the planning conducted for 10 miles provides a substantial basis for expansion of the emergency planning zone should it ever be necessary.¹² Even more recently, the NRC reiterated its position when it denied a petition for rulemaking filed by Nuclear Information and Resource Service and its co-petitioners in an effort to modify the NRC's emergency planning rules.¹³ NRC's denial of the petition cited a lack of information available to government decision makers at the time of the 2011 Japanese incident and downplayed NRC's 50-mile evacuation recommendation as a "travel advisory."¹⁴

In support of maintaining the current 10-mile planning zone standard, NRC states that the information available to it during an incident on U.S. soil would be improved due to the presence of on-site NRC inspectors and direct communication lines from U.S. plants.¹⁵

Further, the NRC emphasized that state and local governments are adequately prepared to handle evacuation scenarios.¹⁶ ("... State and local authorities have a robust capability to effectively evacuate the public in response to life-threatening emergencies."). It should be noted that DAP questions the veracity of NRC's assertions regarding preparedness adequacy and effectiveness, especially given the current lack of planning outside the 10-mile zone.

GAO's report, however, ultimately concluded that because residents beyond the 10-mile planning zone do not receive the safety and planning information that residents within the 10-mile zone do and, due to their lack of knowledge, may choose to evacuate even though they may be outside of the hazard area. Such "shadow evacuations" have the potential to delay evacuation of people most immediately in danger of exposure to radiological materials and are incorporated into evacuation time estimates.¹⁷ The GAO Report states:

[C]ommunities outside the 10-mile zone generally do not receive the same level of information as those within the 10-mile zone and therefore may not be as knowledgeable about appropriate conduct during a radiological emergency as those inside the zone and may not respond in a similar manner. If the public outside the zone evacuates unnecessarily at a greater rate than expected, these shadow evacuations would put additional traffic on roadways, possibly delaying the evacuation of the public inside the emergency planning zone and potentially increasing the risk to public health and safety. However, because neither NRC nor FEMA have examined public awareness outside of the 10-mile emergency planning zone, they do not know how the public outside this zone

¹¹ See *Program Plan for Basis of Emergency Planning Zone Size*, July 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12208A210).

¹² *Id.*; see also 44 FR 61123, Oct. 23, 1979.

¹³ See Petition for Rulemaking; denial, 79 FR 19501 (Apr. 9, 2014).

¹⁴ See *id.* at 19506-07.

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ *Id.* at 19505.

¹⁷ See NRC, *Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies*, NUREG/CR-7002 (Albuquerque, New Mexico: November 2011) at viii (available at <http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1130/ML113010515.pdf>).

will respond. Specifically, they do not know if a 20-percent estimate of shadow evacuations is reasonable. Therefore, licensee evacuation time estimates may not accurately consider the impact of shadow evacuations. Without estimates of evacuation times based on more solid understanding of public awareness, licensees and NRC and FEMA cannot be confident about the reliability of their estimates. If shadow evacuations are not correctly estimated, planning for a radiological emergency may not sufficiently consider the impact of the public outside the emergency planning zone.¹⁸

In light of the GAO's findings and conclusions, DAP surveyed the level of related local emergency preparedness efforts and the level of information provided to the public regarding radiological emergencies within a 50-mile radius of Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station, a nuclear power station located less than 50 miles from Miami, the 45th largest metropolitan area in the United States.¹⁹

Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station and the Population within 50 Miles

Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station (Turkey Point) is a nuclear generating station with two nuclear power units, located on Biscayne Bay, 24 miles south of Miami and just east of the Homestead area. The generating station is capable of generating about 1,400 million watts of electricity. The station is owned and operated by Florida Power and Light.²⁰ Every nuclear power plant operator is responsible for maintaining evacuation time estimate reports for NRC inspection and filing any updated reports with the NRC.²¹

Florida Power and Light's evacuation time estimate report filed with the NRC contemplates shadow (or voluntary) evacuations for residents outside of the standard 10-mile emergency planning zone of the Turkey Point plant.²² The utility's report estimates that 156,157 people permanently live within the shadow zone, that extends as far north as Coral Gables and Kendall and as far West as the Everglades, and that only 30% would voluntarily evacuate.²³ The region is unique because unlike the evacuation procedures for other nuclear plants, most residents and visitors would only be able to evacuate in one direction without the advance warning of a hurricane or other predictable hazard. Further, any expansion of the shadow region to a 50-mile radius would significantly increase the population implicated in shadow evacuations as that geographic area is home to a population of over five million people, according to U.S. Census Bureau estimates.

¹⁸ *Id.* at 26.

¹⁹ DAP determined Miami's rank from a list of the 100 most populous cities in the U.S. See <http://www.city-data.com/top1.html>.

²⁰ See http://www.fpl.com/environment/nuclear/about_turkey_point.shtml.

²¹ See 10 CFR 50 Appendix E Section IV.5.

²² See <http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1036/ML103630183.pdf> at Section 7.1 and Figures 7.1-2

²³ *Id.*

Applied elsewhere, days after the Fukushima Dai-ichi incident when Americans were encouraged to evacuate 50 miles away from the troubled plant, Entergy Energy's own Director of Emergency Planning expressed that neither the company nor the NRC had sufficient information to draw up plans to evacuate New York City (located 38 miles from the Indian Point nuclear plant) which has a population of 8,336,697²⁴ million people.²⁵

Figures 1 and 2 (beginning on page 8) show the stark geographic variation between the established 10-mile emergency planning zone for Turkey Point and a larger 50-mile geographic radius which corresponds to the recommended NRC evacuation area for the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant in 2011.²⁶

²⁴ Most recent estimate by U.S. Census Bureau as of June 2014. See <http://quickfacts.census.gov>.

²⁵ See Operators of Indian Point Say Changes are Likely, New York Times at A23 (Mar. 22, 2011).

²⁶ The NRC also designates a 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone from nuclear plants in its regulations. See 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2). The 50-mile emergency planning zone, however, is designated for the protection of food sources from radioactive fallout and the planning for the ingestion pathway does not contemplate evacuation or sheltering of the public beyond the 10-mile emergency planning zone. See United States Government Accountability Office, *supra* note 1, at 6. DAP chose to survey the local jurisdictions in the geographic area within 50 miles of Turkey Point based on the real-world evacuation recommendation made by the U.S. government for Fukushima Dai-ichi emergency and not based on the current 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway standard.

Fig. 1 - 10-mile radius from Turkey Point Power Plant - Emergency Planning Zone (shaded area)





Fig. 2 - 50-mile radius from Turkey Point Power Plant (blue-shaded area).



The 10-mile emergency planning zone encompasses just one county in the state of Florida, whereas a 50-mile radius stretches to include five other Florida counties. The 10-mile zone contains an estimated population of 2,617,176 and the U.S. Census Bureau estimates the combined population of all the jurisdictions located within 50 miles of Turkey Point is over 5 million people.

DAP Survey of Jurisdictions within 50 miles of Turkey Point

Between June 2014 and July 2014, DAP sent 6 information requests to local jurisdictions²⁷ within the 50-mile radius of Turkey Point seeking the following four categories of documents and information:

1. Educational materials or plans provided to residents up to 50 miles away from the Turkey Point nuclear power plant regarding how to respond to a radiological incident at that plant;
2. All-hazard emergency plans and/or evacuation plans, including any materials regarding procedures to provide real-time information or instructions to residents during an emergency;
3. Emergency plans specific to radiological incidents at the Turkey Point nuclear power plant; and
4. Any studies conducted on the likely rate of "shadow evacuations," defined by the GAO as "residents who evacuate during an emergency despite being told by authorities that evacuation is not necessary." If no such studies exist, local governments were requested to direct DAP to any third parties that have compiled such data.

The table on the following page details the responses from each jurisdiction. Appendix A lists the documents received from each jurisdiction.

²⁷ DAP canvassed the entire geographic area within a 50-mile radius around Turkey Point by contacting every county government and major city within the region.

Table 1. Responses to DAP's Document Requests

Key

E - Jurisdiction stated that documents responsive to the request are exempt from disclosure
 N - Jurisdiction stated that no documents exist
 NR - Jurisdiction did not provide documents or substantive written responses to the request
 O - Jurisdiction did not provide responsive documents for another specified reason
 P - Jurisdiction provided documents or provided confirmation that a third party has possession of the documents in response to the request

| State | Jurisdiction | Distance from Turkey Point (miles) ²⁸ | Population ²⁹ | Req. No. 1 | Req. No. 2 | Req. No. 3 | Req. No. 4 |
|-------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| FL | Miami-Dade County | 0 | 2,617,176 | P | P | P | P |
| FL | Monroe County | 8 | 76,351 | NR | P | P | P ³⁰ |
| FL | Broward County | 38 | 1,838,844 | P ³¹ | P | P ³² | P ³³ |
| FL | City of Hollywood | 40 | 145,236 | N | P | N | N |
| FL | Collier County | 42 | 339,642 | P ³⁴ | P | N | N |
| FL | City of Fort Lauderdale | 45 | 170,065 | P ³⁵ | NR | NR | N ³⁶ |

²⁸ DAP used a web-based tool to find these distances. See <http://www.daftlogic.com/projects-google-maps-distance-calculator.htm>

²⁹ Most recent estimate by U.S. Census Bureau as of June 2014. See <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12011.html>.

³⁰ "information on evacuations can be found by contacting the South Florida Regional Planning Counsel: www.sfrpc.com."

³¹ Produced by the state.

³² Broward plans for ingestion.

³³ State shadow plans provided (gave link to website/plan).

³⁴ State plan.

³⁵ The City website mentions the Turkey Point plant.

³⁶ The City shared utility commissioned Evacuation Time Estimates but none mention Fort Lauderdale. From the correspondence: "he did however provide the state evacuation plans for turkey point but it only projects evacuation times for a 10 mile radius. Fort Lauderdale is not within this 10mile radius so the "shadow effect" information is something I'm still not able to Quantify or give any input towards."

Summary of Responses: Overall

- All six of the jurisdictions provided substantive responses to the information requests.
- Both counties within 10 miles of the plant, Miami-Dade and Monroe, provided a shadow evacuation plan or a referral to a third-party. Only one county, Broward County, between 10 and 50 miles from Turkey Point provided such information.
- One out of two jurisdictions (50%) within 10 miles of the plant and three out of the four jurisdictions between 10 and 50 miles of Turkey Point reported sharing information with the public on how to respond to radiological incidents at the plant.
- Three out of six jurisdictions representing a total of **650,000 people** within 50 miles of Turkey Point could not provide a shadow evacuation plan or emergency plans specific to radiological incidents at the plant.

Summary of Responses: Within the 10-mile zone

- Both jurisdictions within 10 miles of the plant shared their all-hazard emergency plans and/or evacuation plans and their emergency plans specific to radiological incidents at Turkey Point.

Summary of Responses: Outside the 10-mile zone

- Three of the four jurisdictions outside the 10-mile zone failed to share their emergency plans specific to radiological incidents at Turkey Point and shadow evacuation studies either because such documents do not exist or the jurisdiction failed to provide a sufficient substantive written response to the request.

Jurisdictions Located within 10 Miles:

Of the two counties in Florida (Miami-Dade and Monroe) that constitute the 10-mile emergency planning zone, both were very compliant and provided documents or confirmation of documents for most, if not all, of DAP's information requests.

Question 1. Miami-Dade provided educational materials and/or plans as mandated by the NRC in the Code of Federal Regulations, however, Monroe failed to furnish any educational materials or plans. This is notable since Monroe County lies within the 10-mile radius and is therefore legally required to provide residents with information on radiation and protective actions annually, and yet, Monroe did not provide DAP with such inherently public and mandated information.

Question 2. Both Miami-Dade and Monroe counties provided their all-hazard emergency plans and/or evacuation plans.

Question 3. Both Miami-Dade and Monroe counties provided emergency plans specific to incidents at the Turkey Point plant.

Question 4. Miami-Dade provided documents on shadow evacuations and Monroe County referred DAP to the South Florida Regional Planning Counsel for shadow evacuation studies.

Jurisdictions Located Between the 10-Mile and 50-Mile Radius: Only One Provided a Shadow Evacuation Study and Most Have No Emergency Plans Related to the Turkey Point Plant

All of the four jurisdictions located between 10-miles and 50-miles of the Turkey Point plant provided some type of response.

Question 1: Three jurisdictions, the counties of Broward and Collier and the City of Fort Lauderdale, indicated that they provided their residents with educational materials and/or plans regarding how to respond to a radiological incident at the Turkey Point plant. One jurisdiction, the City of Hollywood, stated that no such documents existed.

Question 2: Three out of four jurisdictions located between 10 to 50 miles from the Turkey Point plant furnished their all-hazard emergency plans. The following jurisdictions provided plans: Broward County, the City of Hollywood and Collier County. The City of Fort Lauderdale did not provide any documents or substantive written responses to the request.

Question 3: Only one jurisdiction, Broward County, submitted responsive radiological information. Both the City of Hollywood and Collier County stated that no such documents exist. The City of Fort Lauderdale did not provide any documents or substantive written responses to the request. .

Question 4. Broward County was the only jurisdiction between 10 and 50 miles from the Turkey Point plant to provide any documents on shadow evacuations. The City of Hollywood, the City of Fort Lauderdale, and Collier County both claimed that no such documents existed. Essentially, 75% of the jurisdictions surveyed between 10 and 50 miles of the Turkey Point plant were unable to furnish any documents or studies pertaining to shadow evacuations.

As the GAO pointed out in its report referenced earlier:

"Without estimates of evacuation times based on more solid understanding of public awareness, licensees and NRC and FEMA cannot be confident about the reliability of their estimates. If shadow evacuations are not correctly estimated, planning for a radiological emergency may not sufficiently consider the impact of the public outside the emergency planning zone." ³⁷

Consequently, real gaps in emergency planning may occur without valid shadow evacuation estimates.³⁸

³⁷ See NRC, *Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies*, NUREG/CR-7002 (Albuquerque, New Mexico: November 2011) at 26 (available at <http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1130/ML113010515.pdf>).

³⁸ *Id.*

Conclusion: Public Education and Shadow Evacuation Planning are Inadequate within the 50-mile radius of the Turkey Point Plant.

Florida should not wait for the federal government to act. Florida and its counties and cities within 50 miles of the Turkey Point plant can and should voluntarily plan for emergencies beyond what is mandated by the federal government.

DAP agrees with the GAO Report's conclusion that more study is required to understand the level of public knowledge and the likely public reaction to a nuclear plant emergency, especially beyond the current 10-mile emergency planning zone.

The NRC only mandates an emergency planning zone of 10-miles for the areas surrounding the Turkey Point plant. In contrast, the NRC's public guidance for the actual major nuclear plant disaster at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant recommended that U.S. citizens evacuate if they were located within 50 miles of the damaged Japanese nuclear plant. The NRC and FEMA have not satisfactorily reconciled this disparity between current planning and real-world implementation.³⁹

Shadow evacuations from populated areas beyond the current 10-mile emergency planning zones could result from a public informed and influenced by the media even if local authorities instruct certain members of the public that no evacuation is necessary from their location.

Members of an uninformed public, who have not received the annual emergency preparedness information, likely will turn to other convenient sources of information in order to respond to an actual emergency. A search of the Internet easily turns up several recommendations and suggestions for evacuation to points more than 50 miles away from a stricken nuclear plant, including the NRC's own press release about Fukushima Dai-ichi. In addition, other credible organizations such as Physicians for Social Responsibility and the Smithsonian Institution have web sites discussing 50-mile evacuations.⁴⁰ Also, reliable, well-known media sources reiterate the NRC's 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi evacuation recommendation and display maps showing the 50-mile radius for every U.S. nuclear plant.⁴¹ This readily available, web-based information is a likely source to which the public will turn for guidance, especially in a moment of crisis and in the absence of other information from state and local governments.

³⁹ NRC recently has stated that it "plans long-term action involving [emergency planning zones]" that will rely on a forthcoming Probabilistic Risk Assessment, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation's forthcoming report assessing radiation doses and associated effects on health and the environment, and from Fukushima Prefecture's Health Management Survey and that it will commence rulemaking efforts to make changes if those research efforts warrant changes. See Petition for Rulemaking; denial, 79 FR 19501, 19504 (Apr. 9, 2014).

⁴⁰ See <http://www.psr.org/resources/evacuation-zone-nuclear-reactors.html> and <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-you-live-within-50-miles-nuclear-power-plant-180950072/?no-ist>.

⁴¹ See <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703362904576219031025249872>.

State and local authorities should not wait for the imposition of federal regulatory mandates in order to implement this planning into state and local preparation efforts.

In light of the lack of current planning, DAP believes that additional planning and public information is necessary to increase public awareness of the potential for radiological emergencies beyond the currently mandated 10-mile emergency planning zones. At a minimum, emergency planning authorities from jurisdictions beyond the 10-mile mandatory planning zones should provide better emergency response guidance to the public, conduct shadow evacuation studies and plan accordingly, even if the federal government does not require it.

--

Upon request, DAP will provide copies of correspondence with local governments in response to its information requests. A high-level index of the documents received from the survey effort is attached to this report in Appendix A.

Appendix A

Index of Documents Received From Local Emergency Planning Authorities within 50 Miles of Turkey Point

| State | Local Jurisdiction | Documents |
|---------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Florida | Broward County | Agriculture and Nuclear Power Plant in Florida Turkey Point Safety Planning Information for Neighbors of FPL's Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Broward County Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan Emergency Support Function 14 Standard Operating Procedure Broward County Radiological Plan for Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant (Ingestion County) Florida Statewide Regional Evacuation Study |
| | Collier County | The State of Florida Radiological Emergency Preparedness Annex Collier County Emergency Management All Hazards Guide Collier County Emergency Management Plan (2012) |
| | City of Fort Lauderdale | City of Fort Lauderdale website: http://www.fortlauderdale.gov/departments/fire-rescue/emergency-management/natural-and-man-made-hazards/radiation-contamination Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Development of Evacuation Time Estimates by KLD Associates prepared for Florida Power and Light http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1036/ML103630183.pdf http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1335/ML13357A442.pdf |
| | City of Hollywood | City of Hollywood Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (July 2014) |
| | Miami-Dade County | Turkey Point Safety Planning Information for Neighbors of FPL's Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant |

Monroe County

Nuclear Power Plant, A Preparedness Guide for
Parents
Miami-Dade County, Florida Comprehensive
Emergency Management Plan
Turkey Point Response Plan
KLD Engineering, P.C. Turkey Point Nuclear
Power Plant Development of Evacuation Time
Estimates

Monroe County Comprehensive Emergency
Management Plan
Monroe County Radiological Emergency
Preparedness Plan

Appendix B

DAP's prior work includes the following projects:

- Published field reports concerning disaster accountability and relief transparency include:
 - One Year Follow Up Report on the Transparency of Relief Organizations Responding to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake (Jan. 5, 2011);
 - Report on the Transparency of Relief Organizations Responding to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake (July 12, 2010); and
 - Report on Southern Louisiana Emergency Preparedness (Spring 2009).
- The Disaster Policy Wiki that currently holds over 1,000 post-disaster policy recommendations designed to improve disaster management systems, save more lives and minimize suffering.
- SmartResponse.org, initiated after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and relaunching in 2015, improves the transparency of the humanitarian aid community by increasing public demand for information, educating donors, and exposing what groups are doing and not doing on the ground after disasters.
- The Disaster Accountability Real-Time Hotline serves as a touchpoint after disasters and provides disaster survivors, workers, and volunteers with an outside line to call to report gaps in services. After Hurricane Ike, the Hotline received over 100 calls reporting gaps in services across Texas.
- Citizen Engagement: In 2009, teams of legal volunteers visited 22 parishes across Southern Louisiana to request all-hazard emergency plans. We found that only half the plans were available to the public and fewer were updated and comprehensive. DAP's report received significant media coverage and the resulting attention led to community-level conversations and real plan improvements.